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6.1  Introduction 
In the  1980s, the pharmaceutical industry underwent a period of  tre- 
mendous growth and profitability. This growth was reflected in a 959 per- 
cent increase in a stock index of pharmaceutical firms from 1980 to 1992. 
During the same period, the S&P increased by  386 percent. Growth was 
driven by innovations resulting in part from the adoption of more rational, 
scientific approaches to drug discovery and by  a market structure that 
allowed annual price increases in the 8 to 12 percent range. However,  in 
David J. Ravenscraft is the Julian Price Distinguished Professor of  Finance at Kenan- 
Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. William F.  Long is pres- 
ident of Business Performance Research Associates, Inc., an applied microeconomics con- 
sulting firm in Bethesda, Maryland. 
The authors thank the following individuals for sharing their time and knowledge: David 
Barry, CEO, Triangle Pharmaceuticals (former director of worldwide research and executive 
director, Burroughs Wellcome plc); Rick  Beleson, senior analyst, Capital Research; Paul 
Brooke, managing director, Morgan Stanley; Cliff Disbrow, senior vice president of technical 
operations,  GlaxoWellcome Inc.; Stuart Essig, managing director, Goldman Sachs; Clint 
Gartin, managing director, Morgan Stanley; Henry Grabowski, pharmaceutical economist, 
Duke University; Tom Haber, chief executive, Hadley Investment (former CFO, Glaxo Inc.); 
Rebecca Henderson, pharmaceutical economist, MIT; Douglas Hurt, CFO, GlaxoWellcome 
Inc.; Robert Ingram, CEO, GlaxoWellcome Inc.; Greg Ireland, portfolio manager, Capital 
Research; Suzanne Nora Johnson, partner, Goldman Sachs; Robert Jones, head of strategic 
planning, GlaxoWellcome plc; Rick Kent, director of worldwide research, GlaxoWellcome 
plc; George Morrow, group VP commercial operations, GlaxoWellcome Inc.; Mike Over- 
lock, managing director, Goldman Sachs; Bob Postlethwait, president of neuroscience divi- 
sion,  Eli Lilly; Michael Pucci, director  sales and  training,  GlaxoWellcome Inc.; Charles 
Sanders, former CEO, Glaxo Inc.; Phil Tracy, former CEO, Wellcome Inc.; and John Vernon, 
pharmaceutical  economist, Duke University. The authors also received valuable research 
assistance from Stephane Chretien and Carl Ackermann and helpful comments from Rob 
Gertner and George Baker. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of any of the above named individuals. 
287 288  David J. Ravenscraft and William F.  Long 
true Schumpeterian fashion, booms sow the seed of their own destruction 
(Schumpeter  1950). Enhanced buyer power, increased competition from 
generic and “me too” drugs, the rise of biotechs as an alternative research 
approach, increased government pressure, rising research cost, and a rash 
of major patent expirations dramatically changed the growth and profit 
outlook of pharmaceutical companies. Beginning in the early 1990s, phar- 
maceutical firms’ stock prices dropped and average price increases nearly 
vanished. 
To maintain profitability, pharmaceutical firms had to negate these new 
influences by  limiting buyer power, improving research and development 
(R&D) productivity, or cutting costs. Mergers played an important role in 
helping pharmaceutical firms meet all three of these challenges. Pharma- 
ceutical firms vertically integrated by purchasing pharmacy benefit man- 
agers (PBMs) to help counteract the rising buyer power.’ They sought to 
improve their pipeline and research capabilities through the acquisition of 
biotech firms. However, the most dramatic approach-and  the focus of 
this paper-involved  growing through large horizontal acquisitions. 
The pharmaceutical industry, therefore, provides a rich and active mar- 
ket for studying how recent mergers create value. Over the last decade, 
more than $250 billion of assets were acquired in over four hundred deals 
involving a pharmaceutical or biotech firm. In terms of value, over half of 
these deals occurred during the years 1994 to 1996 (fig. 6.1). These mergers 
dramatically increased firm size. The value of the transactions was over 
$1 billion in approximately fifty pharmaceutical mergers and these deals 
account  for roughly 70 percent  of the merger value. Most  of the very 
largest deals involved the combination of two large pharmaceutical firms. 
Ten of the top fifteen pharmaceutical deals are horizontal. (Three of the 
remaining five are vertical acquisitions and two are diversifying.) The an- 
nouncement of the top sixty-five drug acquisitions created $18.8 billion of 
value for the combined bidder and target. However, if we laok at only the 
horizontal deals, those deals alone created even more value-$19.5  bil- 
lion. 
The largest of these pharmaceutical deals, Glaxo’s 1995 hostile acquisi- 
tion of Burroughs Wellcome, illustrates these trends, challenges, and value 
1.  There were two main motivations for purchasing PBMs. First, pharmaceutical  firms 
thought that owning a PBM could help ensure that their products were on the formulary 
list-a  list of drugs that determined if  insurance companies, HMOs, and hospitals would 
reimburse the patient for the drug. Where comparable drugs existed, PBMs were using for- 
mularies to gain price concessions from drug companies. In particular, Medco demonstrated 
to the drug companies that it had the power to move market share. There is some evidence 
that Merck’s acquisition of  Medco did  increase the number of  Merck drugs on Medco’s 
formulary list and increased Merck‘s market share. After the third PBM merger, the Federal 
Trade  Commission  (FTC)  imposed  constraints  on  the  three  PBM  purchasers-Merck. 
SmithKline Beecham, and Eli Lilly-that  limited this ability to influence PBM formulary 
decisions. The second motivation was to acquire the vast information that PBMs collected 
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Fig. 6.1 
Source: Security Data Corporation. 
Value of pharmaceutical mergers, 1985-96 
creation. Glaxo’s sales increased from E618 million to E5,656 million be- 
tween 1980 and 1994. This growth was led by the best selling prescription 
drug in history, Zantac (a peptic ulcer treatment  that was launched in 
1981). For much of this period, Zantac accounted for over 40 percent of 
Glaxo’s sales. Wellcome’s sales increased from El  ,005 million to E2,662 
million between 1986 (the first full year of public reporting) and 1994. Its 
leading product, Zovirax (a treatment for genital herpes and shingles first 
sold in 1982) also accounted for over 40 percent of Wellcome’s sales and 
was  the fourth best-selling drug in the industry for much of  the  1990s. 
The U.S. patents on these two products expired in 1997. Thus, Glaxo and 
Wellcome faced the challenges of  a changing industry environment and 
the decline of their major sources of growth. By combining two firms with 
similar problems, GlaxoWellcome created over $2 billion in stock market 
value upon the announcement of the merger. 
How did GlaxoWellcome and other large horizontal  pharmaceutical 
mergers create value? For research-intensive, global pharmaceutical firms 
the complete answer is complex. These acquisitions create value by reduc- 
ing cost and enhancing revenue. Cost savings stem from economies of 
scale or scope, reduction of excess capacity, and elimination of inefficien- 
cies. Revenue enhancement results from expanded global reach, broader 
product lines, expanded application of current and future technology, and 
sharing  skill, information,  and  best  practices. These mergers  are also 
driven by the firms’ desire to use a consistent flow of internal funding for 290  David J. Ravenscraft and William F.  Long 
R&D in an industry where the discrete nature of blockbuster drugs makes 
many cash flow profiles volatile. 
Because of the recent nature of these mergers, the cost savings are much 
more apparent at this time. Fortunately, these cost savings appear to be 
substantial. Despite these savings, creative approaches have been needed 
to keep bidders’ shareholders from losing on the deal. Part of the problem 
is that the savings can be offset by the postintegration cost. For example, 
Glaxo estimates that  it  will  cost  $1.8 billion to cover the expenses of 
achieving the merger cost savings. This does not include the tremendous 
temporary disruption and loss of momentum from trying to combine two 
large organizations. Given that Glaxo paid a 40 percent premium (or $3.8 
billion) for Wellcome, GlaxoWellcome must create $5.6 billion in  1995 
discounted dollars plus the nonaccounting postmerger integration cost to 
earn a return for Glaxo shareholders. 
In section 6.2 of this paper, we show the changes in the pharmaceutical 
industry and how they create incentives for mergers. Next, in section 6.3 
we present evidence that value is created in pharmaceutical mergers, that 
targets and some bidders  were underperforming the market before the 
merger, and that cost-cutting in large horizontal deals plays a critical role 
in value creation. In section 6.4, we demonstrate how an active market for 
corporate control in pharmaceuticals arose and the impact that corporate 
governance structure had on this market and the ability of bidders to cap- 
ture value for their shareholders. Section 6.5 begins the focus on Glaxo- 
Wellcome with a brief history of the firms and a description of the events 
leading to the merger. Using GlaxoWellcome, we illustrate how and why 
horizontal mergers cut costs, the potential revenue gains from the merger, 
and the postmerger integration problems that must be overcome to cap- 
ture this value. Section 6.6 discusses how these insights contribute to the 
academic debate surrounding mergers and pharmaceutical economics. 
The paper’s findings are based in part on extensive interviews with in- 
vestment bankers, industry experts, and present and former pharmaceuti- 
cal company executives. We  interviewed five  senior investment bankers 
responsible for pharmaceutical deals-Paul  Brooke and Clinton Gartin 
of Morgan Stanley, and Stuart Essig, Suzanne Nora Johnson, and Michael 
Overlock of Goldman Sachs. We talked with five industry experts includ- 
ing two research analysts or portfolio managers-Rick  Beleson and Greg 
Ireland  of  Capital  Research-and  three  pharmaceutical  economists- 
Henry  Grabowski  and John  Vernon  of  Duke University  and Rebecca 
Henderson of MIT. To gain the perspective of executives that left the firm 
after the merger, we interviewed two former Wellcome senior managers- 
David Barry, worldwide R&D director, and Phil Tracy, CEO Wellcome 
1nc.-and  two former Glaxo senior managers-Tom  Haber, CFO, and 
Charles Sanders, CEO Glaxo Inc. We spoke with one senior pharmaceuti- 
cal executive outside of GlaxoWellcome, Bob Postlethwait, president  of Paths to Creating Value in Pharmaceutical Mergers  291 
neuroscience division, Eli Lilly. Finally, we interviewed seven current exec- 
utives of GlaxoWellcome, covering finance, research, commercial, sales, 
operations, and strategy. The executives of the U.S. operations were Cliff 
Disbrow, senior vice president for technical operations; Douglas Hurt, 
CFO; Robert Ingram, CEO; George Morrow, group vice president for 
commercial operations; and Michael Pucci, director of sales and training. 
The worldwide operations executives included Robert Jones, director of 
strategic planning, and Rick Kent, director  of worldwide research. All 
of these executives continued to play an important role in the combined 
organization often in even more senior positions in the worldwide organi- 
zation. Where possible, we  attempted to verify consensus views with data 
supplied by the interviewees and archival data on industry characteristics, 
merger and acquisitions information, and stock market evidence. 
6.2  The Changing Pharmaceutical Industry 
The pharmaceutical  industry displays several key  characteristics that 
are critical to understanding its challenges. It is  a highly risky business 
with long-term payoffs and lumpy outputs. On average, it takes fourteen 
to fifteen years to go from discovery of a drug to Federal Drug Adminis- 
tration (FDA) approval. The odds of a compound making it through this 
process are around  1 in  10,000, while the cost of  getting it through is 
around $200 million. To cover this cost and risk, the drug companies de- 
pend on a few blockbuster drugs. Even for a large firm, it is not uncom- 
mon for one drug to account for almost half of its revenue. The result is of- 
ten a very lumpy cash flow profile. Yet, the firms depend on internal fund- 
ing of R&D because of well-known problems of asymmetric information 
(Myers and Majluf 1984) and moral hazard (Leland and Pyle 1977).’ 
Despite these challenges, pharmaceutical firms earned consistently high 
accounting profits and growth rates throughout the 1970s and 1980s. An 
important contributing factor was the way in which drugs were purchased. 
Unlike most products, the decisionmakers (doctors), the consumers (pa- 
tients), and the payees (insurance companies) were all separate groups. 
This led to a relatively inelastic demand and annual price increases in the 
8 to 12 percent range for much of the 1980s (see fig. 6.2  be lo^).^ Competi- 
tion was also somewhat muted. Developing a generic drug was relatively 
expensive until after the 1984 Hatch Act. Pharmaceutical companies also 
appeared to develop fewer “me too” drugs in the 1970s. The primary re- 
search method was  serendipity or random searches. This method led to 
2. Hall (1992) summarizes the theoretical and empirical arguments for a positive relation- 
ship between internally generated cash flow and R&D expenditures. 
3. These price increases were for the United  States. Price increases vary greatly around 
the world. For example, over this same period pharmaceutical prices were declining in Japan. 292  David J. Ravenscraft and William F. Long 
less spillover across companies relative to the current rational, scientific- 
based drug research design (Henderson and Cockburn 1996). 
The consequence of this inelastic demand and muted competition was 
impressive increases in drug company stock prices in the 1980s (see fig. 
6.3 below). Between 1980 and 1992 pharmaceutical stocks rose 959 per- 
cent relative to a 386 percent increase in the S&P4  This long-run supranor- 
ma1 performance may also have led to some organizational slack and in- 
efficiency. 
Toward the late 1980s and early 199Os, the profit and growth environ- 
ment began to change dramatically. On the demand side, strong new con- 
straints on pharmaceutical  prices arose. Bundled purchasing, managed 
care, hospital consolidation, and growing government intervention gave 
the buyer strong new powers to negotiate drug prices. The pharmaceutical 
companies also got hit  with  a group of  three-letter  acronyms-PBMs 
(pharmacy benefit managers), HMOs (health maintenance organizations), 
DURs (drug utilization reviews), and DRGs (diagnosis-related groups for 
Medicare). While the primary purpose of these organizations and reviews 
were different, they all served to dramatically strengthen buyer power. By 
the early 1990s, 82 percent of the pharmaceuticals in the United  States 
were  sold through  PBMs, chain pharmacies,  or hospitals.  As a conse- 
quence, “the weighted average price discount to distributors grew from 
4% in  1987 to 16% in  1992” (MacAvoy  1995, 8). The enhanced buyer 
power was also instrumental in aggravating two other demand side trends: 
generic drugs and competition between therapeutically  similar patented 
drugs. 
The rise of the generic drug industry dates back to the 1984 Hatch Act. 
This act greatly reduced the previously large cost of getting a generic drug 
approved (Grabowski and Vernon 1992). The full impact of the act was 
delayed by three factors. First, until the role of the buyer changed, doctors 
and pharmacists lacked strong incentives to encourage generic substitu- 
tion. Second, it took time to overcome public distrust of generic drugs 
and this process was made worse by  plant closings, bankruptcies,  and 
FDA bribery charges involving generic firms in 1987. Third, strategies by 
drug companies forestalled generic substitution. These included improved 
formulation, distinct product appearance, production economies, and re- 
formulation of  dosage^.^ By  1992, cost-cutting incentives were increased 
and public trust in generics improved. Grabowski and Vernon (1996) show 
that between 1989 and 1992 generic market share had increased from 47 
to 72 percent. 
4.  When calculating long-run price indexes it can be important to adjust for relative risks 
5. See MacAvoy (1995) for a more detailed account of these demand side trends and the 
or p. However, for pharmaceutical firms the average p is very close to one. 
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Industry sources also suggest that there has been a rise in the number 
of “me too” drugs. This appears to be occurring despite the widespread 
belief that these drugs are often unprofitable. The cause of this rise is un- 
clear. One possibility is that the rational, scientific research method has 
increased the ability of firms to learn from each other’s announcements of 
successes and failures at each stage of the development process (Hender- 
son and Cockburn 1996). Regardless of the cause, it is true that a substan- 
tial number of the drugs in development are targeting the same disease. 
The number of  drugs in development in  1996 included more than 200 
cancer medicines (48 for breast cancer), 132 drugs targeting aging-related 
illnesses (20 for arthritis and 22 for Alzheimer’s), and 110 for AIDS and 
related diseases.6  Perhaps even more important than trends in “me too” 
drugs is the ability of  large buyers to leverage the competition between 
similar drugs through formularies. Formularies reduce transaction costs 
and increase buyer power by restricting the number of drugs that can be 
used to treat an illness. Pharmaceutical firms are forced into fierce compe- 
tition to get their drug on a formulary. To make matters worse, McKinsey 
claims that they can design a formulary that can “meet 95% of the cur- 
rent drug needs . . . with only 247 drugs . . , 70% of these drugs are al- 
ready generic, and this number will rise to almost 90% by 1998” (Pursche 
1995, 20). 
A final factor that negatively affected drug prices was politics. Because 
pharmaceutical products are priced well above marginal cost and because 
drug price increases throughout the 1980s had consistently exceeded the 
consumer price index, pharmaceutical companies became an easy target 
for Hillary and Bill Clinton’s 1992 health care reforms. Although these 
reforms were substantially scaled back, they did put enormous political 
pressure on pharmaceutical firms to restrain price increases. 
The consequence of these demand side trends is clearly illustrated in the 
Bureau of  Labor Statistics (BLS) Drug Producer Price Index shown in 
figure 6.2. Sometime in 1991, the ability of pharmaceutical firms to consis- 
tently increase prices ended. While this BLS series has some known biases, 
they cannot explain the sudden drop in price increases in 1991. With the 
exception of one small blip, the inability to raise drug prices has continued 
into 1996. 
Drug companies were also getting squeezed on the cost side. A pharma- 
ceutical industry association estimates that the average 1995 constant dol- 
lar cost of internally discovering and developing drugs has risen from $125 
in  1986 to $400 in  1995. Despite this cost increase (or maybe because 
of  it), the amount that pharmaceutical  companies invest in R&D rose 
6. The statistics come from the pharmaceutical organization PhRMAi Facts and Figures 
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Fig. 6.2  BLS drug producer price index, 1976-96 
continuously. Total pharmaceutical R&D has increased from $4.1 billion 
in  1985 to $8.4 billion in  1990 and to $15.8 billion in  1996. A similar 
increase is observed in R&D expressed as a percentage of sales. This num- 
ber rose from 14.8 percent in 1984 to 15.9 percent in 1990 to 19.0 percent 
in 1996.’ Henderson and Cockburn (1996, 43) also observe this dilemma, 
“Perhaps the most dramatic effect visible in the time-series aggregates is 
the continuing increase in research spending despite the fact that the mean 
cost per important patent rose dramatically from 1975 onwards.” 
Competition on the research side also arose in the form of small entre- 
preneurial pharmaceutical companies that are most commonly identified 
as “biotechs.” The number of  these companies in the United  States in- 
creased from 333 in 1980 to 1,072 in 1990. The number of biotech products 
in clinical development almost doubled in the five-year period  1989 to 
1993. 
A final challenge facing pharmaceutical firms in the early 1990s was 
the forthcoming patent expiration of a large number of blockbuster drugs 
without clear indication of replacements. There were twenty-one “billion- 
dollar-a-year’’  products in 1993. Many of these were slated to go off patent 
by  the year 2000. Yet  not a single new drug was expected to reach this 
blockbuster status during that same time period. As a consequence, many 
7. PhRMA (1996) Paths to Creating Value in Pharmaceutical Mergers  295 
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Fig. 6.3  S&P  drug index versus S&P  composite index, 1980-96 
Source: Datastream International. 
drug companies were flush with cash but short on the critical steady cash 
flow profile needed to continuously fund R~CD.~ 
The critical nature of these challenges became apparent to the stock 
market at the end of 1991. As figure 6.3 demonstrates, collectively phar- 
maceutical companies experienced their first sharp long-term decline in 
over a decade. Drug firms began to underperform and buying drugs on 
Wall Street rather than in the research lab began to look attra~tive.~ 
These facts concerning the state of the pharmaceutical industry make it 
clear that pharmaceutical firms were at a critical turning point in the early 
1990s. If they were going to sustain the growth rates that were driving their 
pre-1991 stock prices, they would have to do so through one or more of 
three basic approaches-counteract  buyer power, develop unique drugs 
quicker, or cut costs. 
The industry  used  mergers  and  acquisitions to address all three ap- 
proaches. The three  large vertical mergers,  Merck-Medco,  SmithKline 
Beecham-Diversified, and Eli Lilly-PCS,  were attempts to address buyer 
8. The information in this paragraph comes from the article “A Dry Period,” Forbes, 24 
April 1995, which also explains that this lack of research productivity arises more from the 
nature of scientific breakthroughs than from incompetence on the part of pharmaceutical 
firms. 
9. Note that the drug stock index does begin to rise sharply again in late 1994, but only 
after the industry began to address some of these problems through mergers. 296  David J. Ravenscraft and William F.  Long 
power by either co-opting that power or managing it through information. 
If they were successful, they would have increased the challenges faced by 
the rest of the industry who lacked access to PBMs and their informa- 
tion capabilities.1° 
Since the rise of biotechs,  large pharmaceutical  companies have ac- 
cepted the value of acquisitions and alliances with these firms. The con- 
cept  of  a  virtual  corporation-what  Eli  Lilly  calls  “research without 
walls”-has  been developing steam in this industry. The number of strate- 
gic alliances, which averaged around 150 per year during the years 1986 
to 1989, rose to almost 400 per year in 1992-94  (PhRMA 1996). However, 
this trend raises questions about the optimal level of R&D inside large 
pharmaceutical firms. 
The conditions faced by the pharmaceutical industry in the early 1990s 
are best described by the concept of “free cash flow’’ (Jensen 1986).” The 
culmination of  demand constraints, cost increases, alternative  research 
mechanisms, and declining pipelines strongly indicates that research pro- 
ductivity  was  declining.  When  firms  failed  to  address  these  changes 
through cost cutting, their stock prices fell, Pharmaceutical firms flush 
with cash from past R&D successes could purchase products by  taking 
over other companies cheaper and faster than they could through internal 
R&D. This action was even more important for firms whose blockbuster 
products were coming off patent and who did not have a sufficient pipeline 
to replace them. By  using mergers to consolidate operations and cut out 
the excess industry capacity, the bidder could pay for the premium needed 
to acquire another firm’s pipeline. 
Recently, two articles have strongly demonstrated the potential advan- 
tages and impact of these cost-cutting mergers. McKinsey estimates that 
the changes in the pharmaceutical industry have led to sufficient excess 
capacity that a total of $60 to $90 billion in net present value could be 
cut from the U.S. pharmaceutical industry alone. “To put this number in 
perspective, the total value of fulfilling all disease-based unmet medical 
needs in the U.S. (through drug usage) is on the order of $120 billion 
10. However, a 1995 study by the General Accounting Office (GAO) suggested the PBM 
acquisitions did not substantially help the pharmaceutical acquirers. The fact that two of the 
three PBM acquisitions were undone within five years after the merger suggests they did not 
produce the anticipated gains. 
11. Jensen used the characteristics of the oil industry in the early 1980s to illustrate the 
concept of free cash flow. It is interesting to note that the pharmaceutical industry in the 
1990s shares many of these same characteristics. Both industries have projects with substan- 
tial uncertainty, high upfront costs, and long payout periods. They both experienced a period 
of substantial price increases that led to some false expectations of this continuing. However, 
there are also important differences between these industries. In particular, it is very difficult 
for raiders to take over R&D firms using debt financing. The consolidation in the pharma- 
ceutical industry had to be done by other large pharmaceutical firms. Paths to Creating Value in Pharmaceutical Mergers  297 
NPV” (Pursche 1995, 19). After interviewing senior human resource man- 
agers at six U.K. pharmaceutical companies, Jones (1996, 30) concludes 
that “the views expressed by the six respondents indicate that leading phar- 
maceutical companies no longer see R&D as a core activity. This change 
represents an attempt to reduce R&D spending and improve efficiency in 
response to the many external pressures which face the industry.” While 
both  of  these statements seem a little extreme, they illustrate how  the 
changing pharmaceutical  environment has created potential  gains from 
consolidating through large horizontal mergers. 
6.3  Characteristics of Value Creation 
Measuring the  value creation  from  pharmaceutical  mergers is  chal- 
lenging for two reasons. First, the majority of mergers took place in the 
period 1994-96.  For this paper, the postmerger time series is too brief for 
ex post measures such as changes in accounting profits or patent counts. 
Second, the pharmaceutical industry is very dynamic. The business press 
is filled with a constant stream of news about the industry and individ- 
ual firms. Announcements concerning new  drug discoveries, regulatory 
changes, legal matters, alliances, and individual drug cash flow projections 
are common. This makes it difficult to assign long-term changes to any 
one event without a large sample to reduce the noise. Given these con- 
straints the best measure is the stock market reaction using fairly narrow 
windows.12 
The average abnormal stock market reactions to the announcement of 
sixty-five pharmaceutical  deals  occurring  between  1985 and  1996  are 
13.31, -2.12,  and 0.59 percent for the target, bidder, and combined firms, 
respectively. The target and bidder abnormal returns are statistically sig- 
nificant, but the combined returns are not. These acquisitions include all 
deals over $500 million for which the bidder and the target have stock 
market data.I3 A merger or acquisition was considered a pharmaceutical 
transaction if Security Data Corporation listed either the bidder or target 
as a pharmaceutical or biotech company. The market’s reaction was cal- 
culated using standard event study methodology with a three-day event 
12. Even  the narrow  window can be  somewhat problematic. For example, Glaxo  an- 
nounced a decline in sales of its leading drug Zantac on the same day that it announced the 
Wellcome merger. Three days later, Glaxo announced the acquisition of Affymax, a leader 
in combinatorial chemistry, for $592 million. In the same month of the merger announce- 
ment, Glaxo received U.K. approval for an over-the-counter (OTC) version of Zantac, while 
the FDA rejected an OTC version of Wellcome’s Zovirax. Both of these events significantly 
influenced the firms’ stock prices. 
13. The bidder or the target were non-U.S. companies in 45 percent of these deals. Because 
of the broad worldwide coverage of Datastream International, there were only fourteen deals 
in the over $500 million category for which we could not find data. 298  David J.  Ravenscraft and William F.  Long 
window centered around the first announcement of the winning bid.I4  The 
market model was estimated for 240 days to 40 days before the announce- 
ment  of the transaction.  Consistent with the findings from the general 
population of mergers occurring since 1980 (e.g., Bradley, Desai, and Kim 
1988), the target shareholders gain and the bidder shareholders lose in the 
typical pharmaceutical deal.I5 
The combined firm abnormal return was calculated as the weighted av- 
erage of the bidder and target abnormal returns with the weights being 
the market value of the firm forty days before the merger announcement. 
The 0.59 percent return value is the simple average of the combined firm 
value for all sixty-five firms. Thus, on average pharmaceutical  mergers 
create a small amount of  value for the combined shareholders. A more 
accurate way  of  computing total value created is to compute the dollar 
value created for each merger (target abnormal return times target market 
value plus bidder abnormal return times bidder market value). The sum 
of the dollar value created for all sixty-five mergers is $1 8.76 billion (U.S.). 
Pharmaceutical acquisitions differ across a number of key characteris- 
tics. In table 6.1, the impact of these characteristics on the abnormal re- 
turn to the target, bidder, and combined firm is explored. With respect to 
shareholder value creation,  two  characteristics  stand  out-large  hori- 
zontal mergers and cross-border transactions. Large horizontal mergers 
are defined as the combination of two of the top thirty firms whose pri- 
mary industry is pharmaceuticals. A listing of these top firms and mergers 
is given in figure 6.4. These mergers generate statistically significant (at the 
10 percent level) abnormal return of 9.84, 4.97, and 7.60 percent for the 
target, bidder, and combined shareholders relative to other pharmaceuti- 
cal deals. To put this in perspective, the sum of the combined shareholder 
dollar value created for the ten large horizontal drug mergers is  $19.47 
billion. This is more than the total value creation of the entire sample of 
sixty-five pharmaceutical acquisitions. 
Deals that cross national boundaries also earn impressive returns for all 
shareholders. The target, bidder, and combined returns are 6.40,4.25, and 
3.53 percent relative to other drug acquisitions with all but the target re- 
14. We also used an eleven-day window centered around the announcement day. The target 
firm returns were slightly higher and the bidder firm returns were slightly lower. A disadvan- 
tage of narrow windows around the first announcement date is that we do not capture leaks, 
rumors, or prior announcements with other bidders. Hoechst’s acquisition of Marion Mer- 
re11 Dow illustrates this point. Marion Merrell Dow was thought to be a target for over six 
months before a final deal with Hoechst was announced. There was little reaction in Dow’s 
stock price when the deal was  finally announced (see table 6.2). Thus, we  have probably 
underestimated the return to targets and the total value created in the deal. A sensitivity 
test, which eliminated any deal that does not display a significant positive reaction to the 
target, does not affect the results. 
15. These bidder losses occur despite the fact that we arbitrarily assigned bidder status to 
one of the two partners in the mergers of equals. As table 6.2 shows, the shareholders of 
these merger of equals “bidders” earned over 13 percent in above market returns. Paths to Creating Value in Pharmaceutical Mergers  299 
Table 6.1  Regressions of Abnormal Stock Market Returns on Deal 
Characteristics for Sixty-Five Top Pharmaceutical Transactions, 
1985-96 
Target Return  Bidder Return  Combined 
Intercept (%) 
Horizontal (%) 
Partial acquisition (%) 
Cross border (%) 
Hostile (YO) 
Vertical (YO) 












































-  1.09 
(-0.45) 
0.28 
Note: The parentheses contain t-statistics. Partial acquisition equals one if the target was a 
subsidiary of a publicly traded company or the target was a divested unit of a publicly traded 
company. Cross border equals one if the bidder and target home country were not the same. 
Hostile equals one if the target was  put into play through a hostile acquisition. Vertical 
equals one if the target was a PBM. Relative size is the target market value divided by the 
bidder market value. 
turn statistically significant. This positive impact of cross-border acquisi- 
tions supports the general theoretical and empirical work on international 
acquisitions  (Harris  and  Ravenscraft  1993).  Cross-border  deals  like 
SmithKline Beecham and Pharmacia Upjohn expand global marketing by 
pushing one firm’s products through the other firm’s sales force. 
Hostile takeovers and vertical integration deals pay significantly higher 
target premiums and partial  acquisitions and smaller deals pay  signifi- 
cantly lower premiums. However, these differences are not  sufficient to 
statistically affect the bidder or combined return. 
A closer look at the stock market’s reaction to individual deals provides 
additional insight into the impact of deal characteristics. The individual 
returns for the top fifteen deals are given in table 6.2. Eleven of the fifteen 
deals created value for the combined shareholders. However, three of the 
losses were large-over  $1.4 billion. Two of the three big losers were verti- 
cal, pharmacy  benefit managers deals (Merck-Medco and Lilly-PCS).  l6 
The other deal that created large losses for shareholders was Kodak’s di- 
16. Analysts suggest that the remaining large vertical deal created value because of the 
way it was structured. The SmithKline Beecham-Diversified acquisition was not dilutive for 
SmithKline, in part because U.K. firms can immediately deduct the massive goodwill that Table 6.2  Market-Adjusted Returns to the Top Fifteen Pharmaceutical Mergers (198596) with Stock Market Data 
Percentage  Percentage  Percentage  Total 
Value of  of  Target  of Acquirer  of Weighted  Stockvalue 
Target  Target  Acquirer  Acquirer  Date  Date  Transaction  Stock  Stock  Stock  Created 






































































































































(continued) Table 6.2  (continued) 
Target 
Name 
Percentage  Percentage  Percentage  Total 
Value of  of Target  of Acquirer  of Weighted  Stock Value 
Target  Acquirer  Acquirer  Date  Date  Transaction  Stock  Stock  Stock  Created 
Nationn  Name  Nationa  Type”  Announced  Effective  ($millions)  Return  Return  Return  ($millions) 
Sterling Drug  us 
We  11 corn  e  UK 
PLC-OTC 
Products 





Gerber Products  us 
AH Robins Co.  us 
Diversified  us 
Pharmaceutical 
Eastman  US  D  01/25/88 
Kodak 






Warner-  us  H, CB  07/28/93 
Eli Lilly  us  v  0711 1/94 
SandozAG  SZ  D  05/23/94 




SmithKline  US  V  05/03/94 
Beecham 
Corp. 
02/29/88  5,100  7.41  -15.27  -11.93  -2,146 
06/30/94  4.397  6.69  2.39  3.53  467 
11/21/94  4,000  33.49  -  16.05  -7.80  -  1,494 
12/19/94  3,686  47.52  -0.70  6.92  999 
1211 5/89  3,194  21.45  -0.24  4.04  523 
05/21/94  2,300  13.50  4.62  6.26  622 
Source: Security Data Corporation Mergers and Acquisitions Data Base and Datastream International 
=SW = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States, GR = Germany, SZ = Switzerland. 
bH  = horizontal, V = vertical, ME = merger of equals, CB = cross border, D = diversifying. Paths to Creating Value in Pharmaceutical Mergers  303 
Table 6.3  Industry-Adjusted Long-Run Premerger and Postmerger Performance of the 
Bidder and Target in Large Horizontal Mergers 
Cumulative Stock Return 
between 87 Weeks and 9 Weeks 
before the Merger 
Cumulative Stock Return 
between 9 Weeks and 87 Weeks 





Marion Merrell Dow 
Targets average 












-  12.92 
-41.64 
-27.52 












the industry. What factors led some firms to pursue or to be the target of 
large horizontal acquisitions? The stock market evidence in table 6.3 can 
provide a partial answer. This table gives the market performance of firms 
involved in a large horizontal  merger for a period of  one and one-half 
years before and after the merger. (In a few cases, we  only had one year 
of postmerger data.) Target and bidder performance is measured relative 
to an index of pharmaceutical firms that did not engage in horizontal or 
vertical pharmaceutical mergers. Because we  are interested in explaining 
why firms become bidders or targets, we want to eliminate any change in 
stock values associated with rumors of the merger. Thus, we  eliminate the 
eight weeks immediately preceding the merger announcement. Similarly, 
we  eliminate the  eight  postmerger weeks  to focus  on only postmerger 
events that are not associated with the deal announcement. 
To construct this table, we  began with the complete list of major phar- 
maceutical firms given in figure 6.4. This figure shows the market shares 
before and after mergers for the leading firms. We  wanted a list of hori- 
zontal merger firms and a control group of firms that did not engage in 
pharmaceutical mergers. From that list, we  eliminated firms with incom- 
plete weekly  stock data from  1990 to the middle of  1996. To  focus on 
only recent, horizontal  mergers with clear bidders and targets, we  also 
eliminated firms engaged in vertical mergers, pharmaceutical mergers be- 
fore 1990, or mergers of equals. This left us with a sample of four large 304  David J. Ravenscraft and William F.  Long 
pharmaceutical mergers (American Home Products’ acquisition of Ameri- 
can Cyanamid in  1994, Roche’s acquisition of  Syntex in  1994, Glaxo’s 
acquisition  of Wellcome in  1995, and Hoechst’s acquisition  of  Marion 
Merrell Dow in 1995) and six control firms (Pfizer, Johnson and Johnson, 
Bayer, Abbott, Sanofi, and Schering). We created an equal-weighted index 
of the control firms and subtracted it from the target, bidder, or merged 
firm’s return. Finally, we cumulated the adjusted return over the premerger 
and postmerger period. 
The returns to the target firms are very consistent. All of the target firms 
were underperforming their peer group in the eighteen months before they 
became a target.  On average, the targets lost 22 percent of their value 
during this period. Target firms were either failing to address the chal- 
lenges of this changing industry or they had additional difficulties (such 
as the impending patent expiration of Wellcome’s Zovirax). The evidence 
on the bidder returns is less clear. Two of  the firms, Glaxo and American 
Home Products,  displayed stock losses similar to the targets. One firm, 
Roche, dramatically outperformed its industry in the premerger period. 
The postmerger findings for the combined firms is equally mixed. This 
suggests that there is no systematic reevaluation of the merger announce- 
ment stock returns discussed above. 
6.4  The Market for Corporate Control in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
A wave of pharmaceutical mergers was feasible because this market is 
so unconcentrated. The dispersed nature of this industry is clear from fig- 
ure 6.4. Before the recent wave began, the top ten firms controlled only 29 
percent of the worldwide market. Even after substantial merger activity, 
the top ten firms control only 38 percent of the market. There are still a 
substantial number of firms that have not participated in the large hori- 
zontal consolidation. One industry expert indicated that there are prob- 
ably forty companies for which consolidation still makes sense. 
A significant amount of research in finance has shown a link between 
ownership and performance.ls The difficulty is that  the relationship  is 
complicated. A large shareholder can provide important monitoring  of 
corporate activity including the decision to acquire or be acquired (Fama 
and Jensen 1983). When the large shareholder is management or is aligned 
with  management,  entrenchment  can  harm  performance  and  block 
changes in corporate control (Stulz 1988). Many firms in the pharmaceuti- 
cal industry have a single shareholder or shareholder group with over 5 
percent  ownership. This  concentrated  ownership  structure  stems from 
three  sources. First,  many  of  the pharmaceutical  companies began  as 
family-owned businesses and the family or related endowment maintained 
a significant stake (e.g., G. D. Searle, Richardson-Vicks, Eli Lilly, Johnson 
18. See Servaes and Zenner (1994) for a review of this literature. Paths to Creating Value in Pharmaceutical Mergers  305 
and Johnson, Upjohn, Roche, Merck AG, Wellcome plc). Second, large 
global pharmaceutical companies often reside in countries where signifi- 
cant ownership is a common form of corporate governance (e.g., Astra, 
Novo  Nordisk,  Sandoz, Rhone-Poulenc, Schering, Synthelabo, and al- 
most all of the Japanese pharmaceutical companies). Third, the pecking 
order hypothesis suggests that if  internal funds are unavailable then the 
next best solution to the R&D-related information asymmetry and moral 
hazard problems is large block equity ownership (e.g., SmithKline Bee- 
cham, Syntex, and Zeneca).I9  Corporate theory suggests that this concen- 
trated ownership structure should both facilitate and block merger activ- 
ity. Both outcomes are evident in pharmaceuticals. A number of firms on 
the above lists have been acquired, while a similar number of  small- to 
medium-size players have remained independent. It is also clear that some 
pharmaceutical firms are willing to use hostile acquisitions to overcome 
managerial entrenchment. The support of the Wellcome Trust for Glaxo’s 
hostile takeover of Burroughs Wellcome illustrates the important role of 
these corporate governance issues. 
From our discussions with industry experts, it is clear that an active 
industry merger market creates unique opportunities and challenges for 
bidders. These include increased strategic focus, a time trade-off between 
reduced uncertainty and scarcity, and the ability to adapt the acquisition 
method to escalating premiums. 
Two pioneering mergers led firms to more actively focus on acquisitions 
as the potential solution to the challenges they faced. Merck’s acquisition 
of Medco in 1993 encouraged other firms to look carefully at the vertical 
integration option. American Home Products’ hostile takeover of Ameri- 
can Cyanamid demonstrated that horizontal combinations could be used 
to dramatically cut costs. These deals escalated the intensity with which 
firms, consultants, and investment banking consider mergers, acquisitions, 
and takeovers. For example, it is not uncommon for major subsidiaries 
and their parents to independently consider alternative merger candidates. 
This increased scrutiny probably increases deal efficiency if it allows firms 
to become proactive rather than reactive. However, a fear is that this envi- 
ronment will encourage entrenched managers to seek acquisitions to avoid 
becoming a target. Surprisingly, we  did not find evidence from our inter- 
views of this acquire-or-be-acquired attitude. 
This active merger market also creates a critical trade-off between re- 
duced uncertainty and scarcity. Pioneering mergers face greater risk.20  The 
potential success of the strategy is unknown. Therefore, investors are likely 
to discount the estimated synergies. Subsequent mergers can learn from 
19. Information on ownership was taken from Worldscope and Compact Disclosure. 
20. For example, even the CEO of Glaxo, Sir Richard Sykes, expressed skepticism about 
American Home Products’ bid for American Cyanamid. According to the Wall Street Jour- 
nal, “Sir Richard scoffed at claims that drug giants could easily boost profits by  gobbling up 
weak rivals like American Cyanamid and slashing cost” (9 September 1994, p. B2). 306  David J. Ravenscraft and William F. Long 
the successes and failures of the pioneers. However, since there is often a 
limited number of good targets, competitive pressures may force firms to 
pay the full value of the synergies. 
A mechanism used to avoid escalating premiums is a merger of equals. 
In these deals, the stocks of both firms are exchanged for the newly created 
stock of the merged company. No premium is paid. The merger gains are 
shared between the two firms. A merger of equals, however, faces what is 
known as “interloper risk,” in which another firm is encouraged to bid for 
one of the two firms. Shareholders might prefer the certainty of receiving 
a target  premium  over the promised future synergies of the merger of 
equals. Thus, for a merger of equals to avoid interloper risk, it is critical 
that the future synergies be quickly incorporated into the stock value on 
the announcement of the merger. Because American Home Products had 
demonstrated the potential cost-cutting savings from horizontal mergers, 
horizontal merger efficiency claims were credible. Thus, subsequent an- 
nouncements of mergers of equals resulted in  immediate and dramatic 
increases in both parties’ stock value (e.g., Pharmacia and Upjohn and 
Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy). 
6.5  GlaxoWellcome Case 
Glaxo and Wellcome have a long and distinguished history dating back 
over one hundred years. Glaxo’s history can be traced back to the late 
1800s and the Nathan family trade and dairy business in New Zealand. 
Their first manufactured product was a dried milk that was trademarked 
as Glaxo (which was derived from lacto). In the 1920s it expanded into 
vitamins by licensing a vitamin D extraction process, using it to reinforce 
baby food and produce its first pharmaceutical, a drop-dose version of 
vitamin D. During the Second World War, Glaxo scientists developed a 
new method for the mass production of penicillin that proved to be critical 
for Britain’s war effort and led to a leading position in antibiotics. Prior to 
Wellcome, Glaxo’s most important acquisition was of a U.K. firm, Allen & 
Hanburys, which brought them not only a leading manufacturer of infant 
foods and insulin, but more importantly a brilliant  scientist, Dr. David 
Jack. For twenty-six years he directed Glaxo’s R&D, developing a leading 
position in respiratory and gastrointestinal ailments. (Jack retired in 1987 
and was replaced by Dr. Richard Sykes, Glaxo’s current CEO.) Glaxo also 
displayed its marketing prowess by beating out Tagamet in the peptic ulcer 
market, even though its product Zantac was developed six years after Ta- 
garnet. “Me too” drugs are not supposed to be blockbusters. Glaxo’s inter- 
national roots expanded in the 1970s and 1980s, including a  1978 entry 
into the United States. 
In 1880, Silas Burroughs and Henry Wellcome, two American pharma- 
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to supply Britain with U.S. compounded  medicines. After  Burroughs’s 
death in  1895, Wellcome became the sole owner of the company. When 
Wellcome died in 1936, he willed the company to the Wellcome Trust to 
ensure that the company’s profits went to medical research and education. 
Wellcome became a public company in  1986 when Wellcome Trust sold 
25  percent of its ownership to the public. It sold another 35 percent in 
1992. Henry Wellcome gave Wellcome a firm foundation in research, glo- 
bal outlook, and marketing. He established the first in-house pharmaceut- 
ical research facilities in 1894, starting a tradition of research that led to 
four Nobel Prizes for Wellcome scientists, including a 1988 prize for pion- 
eering the rational drug approach. This academic-like research tradition 
helped give Wellcome the premier position in antivirals. In the early 197Os, 
Wellcome scientists did what many thought was impossible. They found a 
way to destroy a virus without harming its host cell. This led to Wellcome’s 
two leading products, Zovirax and AZT. Henry Wellcome also established 
an early tradition  in globalization by  forming a U.S. subsidiary in  1906 
and a floating laboratory on the Nile in the early 1900s that helped Well- 
come become a leader in tropical diseases. 
6.5.1  Premerger Challenges 
Glaxo and Wellcome’s phenomenal successes with Zantac and Zovirax 
turned out to be a double-edged sword. Their successes helped fuel the 
growth of large organizations. However, with half  of  their sales in the 
United States and U.S. patents set to expire in  1997, replacing that fuel 
was proving difficult. Glaxo and Wellcome were employing the classic de- 
fenses of these products including improved formulation, litigation to de- 
lay  early entry, and moving to OTC status before expiration (although 
Zovirax was denied FDA approval for OTC). Despite these efforts, ana- 
lysts estimated that both products would lose two-thirds or more of sales 
by  the year 2000. 
Replacing blockbusters is  especially difficult given the changes in  the 
pharmaceutical industry. Generic drug firms were ready to move as soon 
as Zantac and Zovirax patents expired. By  the end of  1996, three firms 
had production facilities with tentative FDA approval ready to produce 
a generic Zantac. Valtrex, Wellcome’s improved formulation of Zovirax, 
already  faced competition  from  a  similar  SmithKline Beecham  drug, 
Famvir. Multiple sources of competition for new unique successful drugs 
developed by Glaxo, like the migraine drug Imitrex, were just on the hori- 
zon (including one developed by Wellcome). While Wellcome retained its 
premier position in antivirals, competition in this area was increasing. The 
U.S. government continued to put pressure on Wellcome to keep AZT 
prices down and the French government has complained about the high 
price of  Imitrex. Hospitals, HMOs, and PBMs have been successful in 
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expiration and the new competition. As with all pharmaceutical compa- 
nies, the cost of doing research continued to rise. Zantac and Zovirax 
were generating enough money to cover these costs and still build up cash 
reserves, but time was running out. If action was not taken, downsizing 
and layoffs would  be  necessary. (In fact, Glaxo was  starting to  shrink 
through  attrition.)  Furthermore, their  declining  stock  price  relative to 
other pharmaceutical firms (table 6.3) and cash reserves could make them 
an attractive takeover target. 
While each firm faced similar challenges, how they reacted to them was 
somewhat different, perhaps because Glaxo, being three times the size of 
Wellcome, could pursue more and larger options. Glaxo pursued all three 
merger-related approaches. Concerns about growing buyer power, Merck’s 
acquisition of Medco, and the informational requirements of new disease 
management programs led Glaxo to consider vertical integration through 
a joint venture with Johnson and Johnson and McKesson to run McKes- 
son’s pharmacy benefit manager division, PCS Health Systems. However, 
when McKesson saw SmithKline Beecham follow Merck by purchasing 
the PBM  Diversified Pharmaceutical,  McKesson  decided to shop PCS 
around before joining in a joint venture. That strategy worked and Eli 
Lilly bid $4 billion for PCS. Johnson and Johnson and Glaxo’s decisions 
not to join in the bidding suggest that they did not see the same value in 
PCS that Lilly saw. Glaxo decided to pursue more modest alliances with 
downstream firms. 
Glaxo also was active in biotech joint ventures, licenses, and acquisi- 
tions. The most dramatic of these was Glaxo’s 1995 acquisition of Affy- 
max, the leader in combinatorial chemistry, for over $500 million. Using 
high throughput screening and robotics, combinatorial chemistry allows 
compounds to be evaluated in a fraction of the time used by more estab- 
lished techniques. In the race to be the first drug in a class to market 
and to increase the time distance with “me too” drugs, increased research 
productivity is critical. Still, the payback from this acquisition is long (pos- 
sibly ten years) and uncertain. These types of acquisitions would not ad- 
dress the Zantac problem. Licensing could help, especially because it di- 
rectly addresses the potential excess capacity problems Zantac would cre- 
ate. Since Glaxo’s inception, when it licensed the process to create dried 
milk, it has had success in licensing. A recent example is Glaxo’s license 
of the HIV drug, 3TC, from Biochem Pharma in 1991. This was Glaxo’s 
first product in the antiviral area. However, competition for licenses is 
intense and it would be difficult to replace Zantac with licensed products. 
Wellcome was considering many of the same options, but at smaller 
levels. However, they also were relying on their strong research tradition. 
They felt optimistic that their pipeline had the potential to replace Zovirax 
with Valtrex, an improved formulation. They predicted that combination 
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AIDS. They even tried to license 3TC from Glaxo. While competitors had 
closed the gap, Wellcome still led in antivirals and thought they had the 
size and a number of promising new products (including 1592, Vertex Pro- 
tease, FTC, and Wellferon) to maintain their leadership position. They 
were working on strengthening some other areas, like central nervous sys- 
tem (CNS), to gain economies of scope. But even these areas contained 
some promising products including a competitor to Glaxo’s migraine drug 
Imitrex, called 3 1  1C. (The FTC felt that 3 1 1  C showed enough promise as 
a unique competitor to Imitrex that it required 31 IC’s divestiture.) Also, 
preliminary  tests revealed that their antidepression product Wellbutrin 
showed promise in helping patients to stop smoking. Their declining stock 
price, however, suggested that the market disagreed with these optimistic 
projections.  Some  disappointments  in  prior  Wellcome  management 
claims, particularly in the cardiovascular area, had hurt Wellcome’s credi- 
bility in the market. This put Wellcome in a difficult position. If they were 
correct in their forecasts, their undervalued  stock price just made them 
a more attractive target. If they were wrong, a sharp downsizing would 
be needed. 
6.5.2  Glaxo-Wellcome Merger 
On 20 January 1995, Glaxo announced its boldest and most direct ap- 
proach to dealing with the changing pharmaceutical industry and the Zan- 
tac problem-the  acquisition of Wellcome. A shocked Wellcome manage- 
ment quickly rejected the offer and began seeking a white knight. In part 
because of a pledge by Wellcome Trust to sell their 40 percent to Glaxo, 
no white knight materialized. On 7 March 1995, Wellcome agreed to the 
merger. 
Using just the announcement-day stock returns, an event study analysis 
of the merger reveals that Glaxo paid a 40.7 percent premium for Well- 
come, increasing Wellcome shareholder value by $3.8 billion. On the day 
of the announcement, Glaxo shareholders earned an abnormal return of 
-5.5  percent for a loss in shareholder value of $1.9 billion. Thus, based 
on the day of the announcement (which was truly a surprise to the market 
and even some senior managers at Glaxo), the merger created $1.9 billion. 
This is probably a lower bound. On the same day of the merger, Glaxo 
announced a decline in Zantac sales of 4 percent. Thus, some of the loss 
in market value may be due to this new forecast. Prior announcements 
concerning declines in Zantac had reduced Glaxo’s shares by as much as 
2 percent. In addition, the market may have been concerned that Glaxo 
would get in a bidding war. Glaxo’s shareholders did earn a positive ab- 
normal return of 3.8 percent when Wellcome finally agreed to the original 
offer. Thus, it might be reasonable to assume that Glaxo shareholders were 
unaffected  by  the merger  announcement. Under  this  assumption,  the 
merger created $3.8 billion in net shareholder value. 310  David J. Ravenscraft and William F. Long 
There are two clear corporate governance issues in the Glaxo-Wellcome 
merger. First, the role of the blockholders in facilitating mergers is demon- 
strated by  the Wellcome Trust. They made it possible for Wellcome to 
become a target and helped Glaxo avoid a bidding war.21  Second, mergers 
sometimes require a change in top management, Sir Richard  Sykes re- 
placed Sir Paul Girolami as CEO just six months before the Wellcome 
acquisition. Girolami strongly favored organic growth over large acquisi- 
tions that would add debt and take funds away from R&D. 
In an interview with  Management  Today, Glaxo’s CEO Sir Richard 
Sykes explained why they merged with Wellcome. “Why merger? Two rea- 
sons, he says. First, the squeeze on health-care costs caused by recession. 
Drug companies with what is perceived as their arbitrary pricing of prod- 
ucts, are easy targets for governments trying to cut costs. And second, 
Zantac. You cannot continue to grow organically if  you have got a 2.4 
billion pound product that  is going on the decline, however clever you 
are. . . . Why Wellcome? Because says Sykes, it is the right size to be man- 
aged, the right shape to be easily integrated, and it had a weakness that 
made it an easier prey than others: it was 40%-owned by  the Wellcome 
Trust, a charitable foundation which had a fiduciary duty to maximize its 
income” (Management Today, December 1995, p. 58). 
Not everyone agreed with Sykes’s motive or selection. William Steere, 
CEO of Pfizer, echoed a common skepticism. “I don’t know what you get 
out of consolidation, frankly. Just being bigger is not particularly better” 
(Business Week, 13 January 1997, p. 110). Others thought that Glaxo had 
only traded a single “Z” problem (Zantac) for a “double Z” problem (Zan- 
tac and Zovirax). We now turn to how consolidating these two problems 
might improve GlaxoWellcome by $2 billion to $5 billion. 
6.5.3  Sources of Value Creation-Cost  Savings 
As discussed above, the simplest answer is through an estimated $1 bil- 
lion a year cost savings. GlaxoWellcome expected to achieve these annual 
savings by the end of  1998. The savings in 1995-97  appear to just about 
cover (on a discounted basis) the $1.8 billion integration cost, which pri- 
marily includes severance and early retirement pay and costs in closing 
sites. Using a discount rate of 13 percent, we can discount the post-1997 
savings back to beginning of 1995 and compare them to our estimates of 
value creation and the premium paid for Wellcome.22  These cost savings 
would need to be sustained through the year 2000 to cover the stock mar- 
21. On the other hand, Wellcome management felt betrayed by the Wellcome Trust. Well- 
come management  had  a written  agreement with the Wellcome Trust that  management 
would be informed and have a voice in any change in control. The Trust overruled this 
agreement because of their perceived fiduciary responsibility to effectively  manage the Trust. 
22.  The  13 percent was the median  discount value reported in the merger filings of a 
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ket’s lower bound estimate of value creation, and through 2006 to cover 
the premium paid for Wellcome and the stock market’s upper bound es- 
timate. 
This exercise is somewhat academic for several reasons. First, three sets 
of projections must be accurate for the cost-savings estimate to be correct. 
The cost  savings are calculated as  the  difference between  the  sum  of 
Glaxo’s and Wellcome’s independent projections prior to the merger and 
the projections of the newly formed GlaxoWellcome. Second, these sav- 
ings ignore other costs and benefits. They do not include the revenue- 
enhancing merger  gains, nor do they include the nonaccounting  post- 
merger integration costs. They also assume that the tax impacts of the cost 
savings are offset by the tax savings from the increased debt.23  Finally, this 
exercise assumes that the cost cutting does not lower revenue. These are a 
lot of  assumptions even for an economist. However, the estimates reveal 
how difficult it is to create value in mergers, especially for the bidder. To 
break even Glaxo must grow and then sustain a $1 billion annual cost 
savings over a substantial length of time. 
How reasonable are GlaxoWellcome’s assumed cost savings? Table 6.4 
compares GlaxoWellcome’s estimates of the projected cost savings and 
headcount reductions to seven other large horizontal mergers. All of these 
mergers project substantial cost savings of between I1 and 29 percent of 
the target’s sales and 8 to 20 percent of the combined firm’s workforce. 
Furthermore, most of these deals have achieved or are well on their way 
to achieving the estimated savings. For example, Roche-Syntex reached 
their estimated cut of five thousand jobs in the first eighteen months after 
the acquisition. Further rationalizations are also possible. On the basis of 
target sales, GlaxoWellcome’s cost-saving estimates are higher than any of 
the other horizontal mergers. On the other hand, GlaxoWellcome’s esti- 
mated headcount reduction relative to combined headcount is about aver- 
age. Investment banking estimates and press reports put the estimate at as 
high as fifteen thousand. This would push headcount reduction to 23 per- 
cent of combined value, which would also be at the top of the list.24  In any 
23. If we  were to assume that there were no tax benefits from the merger, then the cost 
savings would be reduced by around 30 percent (Glaxo’s worldwide tax rate). With this ad- 
justment, the cost saving would need to be sustained through the year 2002 to achieve the 
stock market’s estimated lower bound merger synergies. The cost savings would need to be 
sustained forever to cover the premium paid for Wellcome. While even a crude estimate of 
the merger-related tax savings is difficult for a multinational R&D company like GlaxoWell- 
come, the potential tax savings are sufficiently large (the merger was financed with almost 
$9 billion in debt) that assuming the tax liabilities from the cost savings are covered by  the 
tax saving from the merger seems more reasonable than no merger tax savings. 
24. It is not surprising that GlaxoWellcome’s estimated savings are higher than other com- 
panies’. They have closer geographic overlap than any of the other mergers. Each firm had 
40 to 45 percent of their sales in the United States and 30 to 35 percent in Europe. Both had 
worldwide headquarters in the United Kingdom and U.S.  headquarters in the same state. 
Both were also facing substantial declines in their leading products. Table 6.4  Synergy Estimates and Headcount Reduction for Large Horizontal Pharmaceutical Mergers 
Estimated  Combined 
Annual  Sales at  Cost Saving  Combined  Headcount 
Cost Saving  Time of  as a Percentage  Estimated  Headcount  Reduction as a 
Merger  at Maturity  Merger  of Smaller  Headcount  at Time of  Percentage of 
Date  ($millions)  ($millions)  Co. Sales  Reduction  Merger  Total Headcount 
Novartis” 































































Source:Data from Goldman Sachs, the Monitor Company, annual reports, and “Major Mergers in the Pharmaceutical Industry.” 
“Management estimates of cost synergies only. 
”Originally $500 million in synergies was announced. 
cGlaxoWellcome 1995 Annual Report. 
dCompany progress report on cost/headcount reduction, and Morgan Stanley extrapolation of these to maturity. 
‘Inferred from actual operating profit improvements and sales-adjusted headcount two to three years after merger. 
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event, table 6.4 shows that cost savings are an important part  of  large 
horizontal  pharmaceutical  mergers  and  that  the  insights gained  from 
GlaxoWellcome should generalize. 
To demonstrate how the cost cutting works, the typical cost structure 
of  a pharmaceutical  firm-before  and after a merger-is  illustrated in 
figure 6.5. The cost as a percentage of sales for the average US. and Euro- 
pean firms in 1996 can be divided into administration (5 percent), market- 
ing and sales (30 percent), R&D (15 percent), and cost of goods sold (30 
percent) for an operating profit  of  20  percent. Cost savings may  come 
from the acquired or acquiring company, but for illustrative purposes we 
will assume that all of the savings come out of the target firm expenditures. 
Experts estimate that much of the target’s overhead can be eliminated in 
the merger. R&D in the target company can be cut by  several percentage 
points, and R&D laboratories may be combined and marginal R&D proj- 
ects can be cut. Substantial saving can come from combining sales forces 
and eliminating redundancy. Excess capacity exists in the manufacturing 
operations of most pharmaceutical companies. By  consolidating produc- 
tion into fewer plants, those plants can be operated more efficiently and 
other plants can be sold. A 5 percentage point reduction in the target’s 
commercial operation and a 10 percentage point reduction in manufactur- 
ing operation are obtainable. These reductions total 20 percent of the tar- 
get’s sales, which is the average reduction in table 6.4. This improves the 
90 
Fig. 6.5  Cost savings from horizontal pharmaceutical mergers 
Source; Morgan Stanley presentation on average operating statistics for U.S. and European 
pharmaceutical companies. Size of cuts comes from authors’ discussions with industry ex- 
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target’s operating profit to 40 percent with a total cost savings of $800 
million on the average target’s sales of $4 billion. 
Initial  evidence from  the Glaxo-Wellcome merger demonstrates that 
these cost savings are feasible. Administrative cost savings are clear. Glaxo 
and Wellcome were both research-oriented firms with 100 percent of sales 
in pharmaceuticals and extensive geographic overlap in all of their pri- 
mary  markets.  They  had  similar  organizational  structures  revolving 
around geography and function. Thus, most of the major administrative 
positions were redundant. Once the decision was made as to which indi- 
vidual got the comparable position in the new organization, human nature 
generally drove the other individual to accept early retirement or a sever- 
ance. Similarly, the staff associated with these administrative positions and 
functions could also be reduced. 
The combined firm inherited more than sixty production  sites. Well- 
come had key manufacturing plants in Dartford (U.K.), Greenville (N.C.), 
and Kobe (Japan). Glaxo had three plants in the United Kingdom and 
key sites in Zebulon (N.C.), Verona (Italy), and Singapore. The other sites 
consisted of numerous secondary plants in many countries. This extensive 
system of secondary production sites was driven in part by local content 
requirements and by  a belief that local production helps sales. There is 
substantial potential for savings by  consolidating these plants. Many of 
the secondary production sites can be combined. However, this will take 
time because most of the countries that encourage local production also 
discourage plant closings and layoffs. Most of the large cost savings will 
come from selling the main plants. Wellcome’s Greenville, North Carolina, 
plant was sold. This plant makes primary chemicals, packaged chemicals 
(tablets, creams, and ointments), and steriles. The primary chemicals were 
transferred  to Singapore,  the packaged  chemicals to Glaxo’s Zebulon, 
North Carolina, plant. The large state-of-the-art steriles facility at Green- 
ville was built in anticipation of growth that had not yet materialized and 
therefore was not needed by GlaxoWellcome. The Singapore and Zebulon 
plants had sufficient excess capacity that Greenville’s production could be 
added without major changes in facilities or staff. The Greenville plant 
employed nineteen  hundred  workers. By  1997, Greenville was  the only 
major plant to be sold. However, a team was carefully evaluating world- 
wide production. Expectations were that this effort could easily equal the 
Greenville savings. If realized, manufacturing could account for a signifi- 
cant amount of the total cost savings. 
An analysis of the savings on the commercial side is more complex. 
Until recently, the industrywide trend was to reduce the sales force. Better 
information allowed firms to be more selective in targeting which doctors 
could affect sales and corporate executives held the belief that the concen- 
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ished the role of the doctor in determining prescriptions. New studies indi- 
cate that the doctor’s role is still critical and firms have been reinstating 
sales forces. Glaxo’s plans had been to reduce the sales force through attri- 
tion in anticipation of Zantac’s decline. However, GlaxoWellcome is also 
trying to counteract the decline with new product introductions. Demands 
on the sales force are at a peak for new product introduction. All of these 
factors were  changing around  the merger, making premerger  forecasts 
(which are the foundation of cost-savings estimates) obsolete. 
Adding to this complication is the discrete nature of the sales force pro- 
duction function. Doctors tend to limit the sales discussion to a maximum 
of two to three drugs. Thus, a sales representative will generally handle a 
maximum of four to five drugs. Since most of Glaxo’s products were sold 
to general practitioners, some of Glaxo’s sales force could add Wellcome 
drugs to their portfolio, but others could not. For products that were sold 
to specialists, the economies were clearer. For example, Glaxo’s sales force 
were calling on neurologists with one product, Imitrex. Wellcome had a 
co-promotion agreement with Dupont to sell Wellcome’s Lamictal to neu- 
rologists. With only training costs, Glaxo’s neurologist sales force could 
combine Lamictal and Imitrex, saving on the co-promotion agreement. 
The combination would also improve the sales force’s ability to gain access 
to more doctors. 
After  a complex analysis that  included accounting  for  the  industry 
trends and the decline in Zantac and Zovirax, GlaxoWellcome’s best esti- 
mate is that the merger will allow the U.S. sales force (including contract 
workers) to be reduced. These estimates suggest that the percentage of 
headcount reductions in  the commercial area is similar in magnitude to 
the percentage of headcount reductions for the whole company. 
GlaxoWellcome’s mission statement  begins with  “GlaxoWellcome, a 
research-based company. . . .” Survival in the pharmaceutical industry de- 
pends on top-line growth through innovative products. Toward this end, 
Glaxo recently built a billion-dollar research complex in the United King- 
dom at Stevenage, and acquired the leading firm in combinatorial chemis- 
try, Affymax, for over $500 million. Developing new products and improv- 
ing research productivity remain the firm’s primary focus. 
Nevertheless, GlaxoWellcome did use  the merger to reduce research 
costs in two ways. First, they took a new look at each research project. 
Starting from a clean slate, they eliminated or put on hold marginal re- 
search projects. (They also identified some underfunded projects.) Second, 
they closed Wellcome’s main U.K. research facility in Beckenham, which 
housed fifteen hundred scientists and staff. Some of the scientists and proj- 
ects at Beckenham were transferred to Stevenage, but a significant number 
were cut. Stevenage was designed before the merger with enough capacity 
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it was a challenge to accommodate the added research from Beckenham. 
These two forms of cost savings are, of course, related. Given the difficulty 
in estimating the net present value of a research project in its early stages, 
projects are often decided on the basis of opportunity costs. Reducing the 
space increases the opportunity cost of any one project. 
6.5.4  Sources of Cost Savings 
What mechanism allows GlaxoWellcome to cut costs without jeopardiz- 
ing net present value projects? Economists discuss two fundamental paths 
to true cost savings-economies  of scale or scope and elimination of  in- 
efficiencies. In theory, these concepts are distinct. Economies of scale and 
scope refer to the shape of the cost curves for efficiently operated firms. 
Inefficiency is defined as a firm operating inside of its production possibil- 
ity curve. In practice, these curves can be  estimated with sufficiently de- 
tailed data. However, for the time period and cost factors that we  are in- 
vestigating, such detailed data do not exist.25 
The source of cost savings can be inferred from our discussion of the 
ways costs were  cut. Given that economies of scale are size-based cost 
advantages assuming firms are operating efficiently, these types of savings 
would need to meet three conditions. First, they would need to be savings 
that Glaxo and Wellcome could not have achieved on their own. Second, 
they would have to be  savings that another efficiently operated firm that 
is smaller than premerger Glaxo is not achieving. Third, they would need 
to be  savings that do not stem from excess capacity, that is, savings that 
result from the decline in Zantac or from the changing industry conditions 
discussed in section 6.2 (with the exceptions of conditions that would in- 
crease scale economies). 
Some of the cost savings clearly meet these conditions. The cuts in ad- 
ministrative costs could not have occurred without the added size brought 
on by  the merger. On the surface, it would appear that any merger can 
achieve these economies because you do not need two CEOs, accounting 
departments, legal departments,  and so forth. However, the less related 
the two organizational structures, the less overlap there is to cut and the 
more likely bureaucracy and bonded rationality will offset any cuts. The 
similarity in focus, organizational structure, and location makes the ad- 
ministrative economies of scale feasible for GlaxoWellcome. 
On the other hand, the main manufacturing cost savings do not stem 
25. The only reports in the literature with sufficiently detailed pharmaceutical data to 
estimate production  functions are Cockburn and Henderson  (1995) and Henderson  and 
Cockburn (1996). Their data contain confidential internal records of  ten pharmaceutical 
firms between 1961 and 1988. Their production function relates one input research on new 
compounds to various outputs, most notably important patents.  Thus, even if these data 
were available and updated to include the 1990s, it would cover only R&D cost savings. Paths to Creating Value in Pharmaceutical Mergers  317 
from economies of scale but from a reduction in excess capacity, which is 
achieved by  closing the plants with the greatest excess capacity and op- 
erating the remaining plants more efficiently.26  An exception may be a reg- 
ulatory advantage to size caused by local content requirements. Individu- 
ally, even a highly efficient firm would have to operate a production facility 
in a country with these requirements if it wanted to sell there. Combining 
these firms would allow firms to close one of these facilities. 
The R&D cost savings do not fit either the economies of  scale or re- 
duced excess capacity explanations. Like manufacturing, Glaxo closed one 
of Wellcome’s large R&D facilities. But it was not because Glaxo’s new 
Stevenage facility had excess capacity. Sharing expensive indivisible labo- 
ratory equipment is a classic economies of  scale example. Some of  this 
may be  occurring at Stevenage. However, the indicated source of R&D 
savings stemmed from reducing their scientific workforce and canceling, 
postponing, or delaying projects. These cuts appear to be a recognition of 
the new economics in the pharmaceutical industry and a substitution of 
internal for external R&D. In economic terms, the allocations of resources 
in premerger R&D were inefficient. 
A problem with this source of cost savings, it may be argued, is that it 
could have been achieved without  the  merger^.^' While this is  true, the 
interviews we undertook made it clear that this argument ignores the orga- 
nizational behavior realities of business. A merger allows firms to “start 
with a clean slate” and “take a fresh look at the organization.” In R&D 
and most other areas, GlaxoWellcome used the merger to stimulate the 
organization into considering change.28  If done properly, this change can 
be very positive for an organizati~n.~~  By  combining their problems and 
creating a discrete event, the firms could justify the disruption costs of 
solving their problems through downsizing rather than following their pre- 
merger strategy of reduction through attrition. 
An alternative approach to addressing the question of the source of cost 
cutting is to focus on the timing. Why did GlaxoWellcome merge in 1995 
and  why  was  there  a concentration  of  pharmaceutical  mergers in  the 
1994-96  period? The evidence using this approach falls strongly in favor of 
26. In theory, this excess capacity could be reduced without the merger through coproduc- 
tion  agreements, for example, GlaxoWellcome could have sold some of their  production 
capacity to another firm. These agreements are rare in the pharmaceutical industry (and in 
many others). Even contract manufacturing to independent organizations is not fully utilized 
because of concern about the longevity and reputation of these firms. 
27. There is an indirect excess capacity explanation. If both firms had cut back on R&D 
independently, these cuts would not have been enough to close major facilities. 
28. For example, worldwide technical director Joe Blaker asked managers from each man- 
ufacturing site to justify their existence (Fimnciul Times, 9 April 1996, p.  10). 
29. One interviewee even paraphrased Napoleon,  stating that “to motivate your troops 
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inefficiencies and excess capacity created by the changing pharmaceutical 
economics and the decline of  the firms’ major products. There is  little 
evidence that the economies of scale and scope have changed with respect 
to administrative, manufacturing, or commercial costs. 
There are some significant new developments in R&D that could sub- 
stantially change the economies of scale and scope and greatly stimulate 
the productivity of R&D. Two significant (and related) developments are 
mapping the genes of organisms-from  microbes to human beings-and 
combinatorial chemistry. The cost and potential spillovers of the complete 
genomic sequencing are enormous. These projects will  dramatically in- 
crease the number of  new  drug targets. Combinatorial  chemistry auto- 
mates the search process, increasing the speed by which compounds can 
be tested when new targets are found. The issue is to what extent are these 
going to be the domain of large firms. Smaller firms will still play an im- 
portant innovative role. Affymax, the leader in combinatorial chemistry, 
was a start-up in 1989. Small, focused, genetic research companies are in- 
creasing in number.  In addition, joint  ventures and  government-spon- 
sored research offer an alternative approach to large size in obtaining these 
economies. The human genomic sequencing project is being led by  the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH). GlaxoWellcome has formed a joint 
venture with  SmithKline Beecham for genomic sequencing of  disease- 
causing microbes. Still, large organizations will be able to participate in a 
greater array of these ventures and they will be able to cover the fixed cost 
of development with a larger number of projects. For example, the benefits 
of Affymax technology apply equally well  to Wellcome’s research. Thus, 
the $539 million acquisition cost of Affymax can be spread over a larger 
research base. 
6.5.5  Asset Restructuring 
Glaxo and Wellcome were highly focused organizations. Thus, the op- 
portunities for asset restructuring were limited. However, there were two 
areas where Glaxo thought the assets’ usage was higher in another organi- 
zation. Glaxo did not have an interest in marketing OTC products. They 
sold Wellcome’s OTC business to Warner-Lambert, a company with more 
experience in the OTC business, for $1.05 billion. Warner-Lambert was a 
natural  buyer,  because  both  Glaxo  and  Wellcome  had  joint  venture 
agreements to help switch prescription drugs to OTC status near the end 
of  their patent  life. This reallocation of  assets created significant value 
for both parties. GlaxoWellcome’s abnormal return from the announced 
acquisition was 6.7 percent and Warner-Lambert gained 2.4 percent for 
a total value creation of almost $500 million. GlaxoWellcome also sold 
off  Wellcome’s  Singapore-based cosmetics business  for  approximately 
$140 million. Finally, GlaxoWellcome received an estimated $225 million Paths to Creating Value in Pharmaceutical Mergers  319 
for  the  FTC-ordered  divestiture of  Wellcome’s  migraine drug 31 1C to 
Zene~a.~~ 
6.5.6  Revenue 
GlaxoWellcome believes there is significant potential for revenue growth 
from the merger. Top-line growth can come from a broader product line, 
the incorporation of each organization’s best practices, scientific and tech- 
nical gains, expanded global reach, and building a new corporate culture. 
The broader product line can increase access to doctors and help counter- 
act buyer power. Through a careful selection of best practices, GlaxoWell- 
come can take advantage of each other’s strengths. By leveraging modern 
technology and each organization’s research skills, the merger can enhance 
the productivity of R&D. Also, combining Glaxo and Wellcome research 
at Stevenage will  increase the exchange of ideas between projects (i.e., 
economies of scope). As the abnormal returns regressions indicate, the 
gains from expanding cross-border deals are substantial. Although there 
is a substantial overlap in Glaxo and Wellcome’s vast global organizations, 
the combined organizations nevertheless have a stronger global presence 
and reach  allowing them  to capture some of the advantages of  cross- 
border  deals.  Different corporate cultures can destroy value.  However, 
GlaxoWellcome emphasizes the desire to build a new and better culture 
by  combining the academic freedom of the Wellcome organization with 
Glaxo’s business focus. 
GlaxoWellcome admits, however,  that  articulating to outside parties 
these intangible benefits relative to the more certain and quantifiable cost 
savings is challenging. As  noted,  the cost  savings are potentially large 
enough to create value for both Glaxo and Wellcome shareholders. Reve- 
nue gains are more important the faster cost savings are dissipated and 
the larger the intangible postmerger integration cost. 
6.5.7  Postmerger 
Many mergers fail because of postmerger integration problems (Smith 
and Quella 1995). Research has identified several key issues to assessing 
postmerger success. These include the extent of organizational autonomy, 
the speed of integration, the ability to maintain top management and key 
30. The final divestiture agreement took a long time to hammer out, partly because strate- 
gies for divesting these types of intangible assets are at the forefront of antitrust. The FTC 
is asking the firm to help it create a competitor. FTC experience suggests that when the 
divestiture is not a separate entity with its own assets, the divesting firm has the potential 
and incentive to inhibit its future competitor. In this case, the FTC appointed a trustee to 
oversee the progress of the drug while the parties negotiated for the right buyer and a fair 
price. This issued played a major role in the 1997 Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz merger, in which 
the FTC ordered the licensing of dozens of gene therapies (see Business  Week, 20 January 
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employees,  and  the  communication  of  merger  goals  and  procedures 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). How these issues are addressed depends 
on the nature of the acquisition synergies, the relative size of the two firms, 
and the culture of the two organizations. To achieve the cost and revenue 
savings in the Glaxo-Wellcome merger, organizational autonomy for Well- 
come was impossible. Given Glaxo’s inexperience with acquisitions, the 
other integration issues were addressed with the help of the Boston Con- 
sulting Group. 
GlaxoWellcome decided that integration had  to be achieved quickly. 
Prior horizontal mergers had been criticized for dragging out the merger 
integration  process  (especially  Bristol-Myers  Squibb  and  SmithKline 
Beecham). Speed was critical because serious work delays occur as em- 
ployees worry about their jobs and morale suffers during the process even 
for the survivors. The task of integration involved twenty principal task 
forces that were then subdivided into numerous committees and subcom- 
mittees. It took only nine months for these task forces and committees to 
complete the main integration plans and to lay out the strategic direction 
for each functional and geographic area in the new organization. A special 
magazine devoted to the integration process was developed to communi- 
cate critical issues (e.g., “When will I know if I have a job?”) to the employ- 
ees. While there were  complaints about some decisions being made too 
fast and, with hindsight, the task forces could have better identified and 
focused on the critical paths, the integration in general, appears to have 
handled the speed and communication issue well. 
Retaining top management and key employees was more of a challenge. 
As discussed, almost nothing can prevent the loss of managers who do 
not get the equivalent of their old position in the new company. In some 
cases, this process creates an opportunity to prune marginal managers. 
However, talented managers are often lost and sometimes key employees 
whom they have mentored go with them. The net impact of these changes 
is difficult to assess. Several interviewees suggested that GlaxoWellcome 
lost more talent than they expected. In part, this was due to the generous 
nature of the retirement and severance pay.3’ 
Perhaps the most controversial postmerger issue does not appear in the 
standard list given above. Often the terms merger and acquisition are used 
interchangeably. In this case, the words carried  great meaning.  Senior 
management decided that the Glaxo-Wellcome deal should be called a 
“merger” for the purposes of postmerger integration. For research- and 
marketing-driven pharmaceutical organizations, knowledge resides in the 
scientists and sales force. Glaxo needed to keep these employees if  the 
merger was to succeed. They were also serious about creating value by 
31. Even former managers gave GlaxoWellcome high praise for the way  they treated de- 
parting employees. The retirement and severance packages were felt to be generous. Paths to Creating Value in Pharmaceutical Mergers  321 
developing a new culture and employing the best practices of each or- 
ganization. They felt that these objectives could not be met if  Glaxo was 
“acquiring” Wellcome. Accomplishing this goal has proved to be difficult. 
Given that  the merger began  as a hostile transaction, many Wellcome 
employees remained skeptical. This skepticism increased as Glaxo’s man- 
agers began obtaining a large number of senior positions, even though 
some of this imbalance was expected. Glaxo was three times Wellcome’s 
size and many Wellcome managers were older and more likely  to take 
early retirement (especially in countries like the United States where Well- 
come had been since 1906 and Glaxo only since 1978). The downside of 
this strategy was that it also put Glaxo employees at risk. “Under US law, 
severance terms had to be offered to all employees of the combined com- 
pany there” (Financial Times, 9 April, 1996). As a consequence, they lost 
valuable employees on both sides. Gains from applying the best practices 
of both organizations also came up against some roadblocks. There were 
cases in  which  Wellcome’s  procedure  or equipment  was  superior  but, 
because of  Glaxo’s size, it was cheaper  and more expedient to adopt 
Glaxo’s version. 
In sum, integration leads to inevitable disruption and significant tempo- 
ral losses. There is a period where the organization is more focused on the 
integration than on productivity. In general, GlaxoWellcome handled the 
postmerger integration issues extremely well. Still, managers admit to sig- 
nificant temporal losses from the integration process. The best concrete 
example is in sales. GlaxoWellcome had to totally reconfigure and retrain 
their sales force. Employees did not know what their job was or if  they 
had  a job.  Although  GlaxoWellcome resolved  these  issues  extremely 
quickly, they still had  to pull the sales force from their territories and 
stopped shipping samples for two months. During this time, they lost mo- 
mentum, market share, and some key employees. What makes mergers so 
challenging from the bidder’s perspective is  that the synergies must be 
large enough to cover the premium paid and these postmerger disruption 
costs. 
6.6  Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates the changing nature of the pharmaceutical in- 
dustry and how these changes have led to value-creating horizontal merg- 
ers. By  focusing on the Glaxo-Wellcome merger, we  can illustrate how 
value is created and the roadblocks to achieving value creation. This de- 
tailed industry and firm case study yields insights into a number of issues 
debated in the academic literature. We find evidence that rapidly changing 
industry conditions do generate overcapacity (Jensen 1993) and free cash 
flow (Jensen 1986) that can be reduced through mergers. However, we  hd 
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high debt, raiders, or dramatic changes in compensation. In pharmaceuti- 
cals, industry and stock market pressures were sufficient to induce bidders 
to change, although target manager compensation was insufficient in some 
cases to convince them to give up without hostile actions. We find evidence 
for economies of scale and scope, but we also find that the primary motive 
for increased size stems from the elimination of  excess capacity and in- 
efficiencies induced by  the changing industry structure and firm product 
portfolio. This is consistent with work by Henderson and Cockburn (1996) 
and Dimasi, Grabowski, and Vernon (1995), who show that economies of 
scale and scope exist in pharmaceuticals, but that they are exhausted at 
the size of the largest firm prior to these horizontal combinations. 
With respect to the debate concerning how mergers affect R&D (Hall 
1990; and Hitt et al. 1996), we  find that neither captures the relationship 
in  pharmaceuticals.  Hall argues that  R&D is  not  affected by  mergers. 
However, R&D is cut in large pharmaceutical mergers. Hitt et al. argue 
that R&D is cut in mergers because of increased debt, managerial distrac- 
tion, and the imposition of financial controls. However, R&D remains the 
cornerstone of the merged pharmaceutical firms. Cutbacks are a result of 
changing pharmaceutical  economics making marginal internal projects 
less attractive and some external alliance projects more promising. 
Finally, we  provide insights into why  bidders often experience declines 
in stock market value upon the announcement of a merger. The challenge 
for bidders is not only to create value in the merger, but to create enough 
value to cover a competitive premium and substantial postmerger integra- 
tion costs. Creative bidding solutions, like negotiating with blockholders 
and exchanging shares through a merger of equals, help avoid overpay- 
ment. An  early focus on postmerger integration issues, like integration 
speed, retaining new employees, and building a new culture, are also criti- 
cal to the bidder’s success. 
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Comment  Robert Gertner 
A good clinical paper shifts our prior assumptions by providing a detailed 
interpretative account of an industry  or an event that  the reader finds 
sufficiently compelling to merit some generalization. It also suggests areas 
that  deserve more careful, systematic analysis. David  Ravenscraft and 
William Long’s analysis of  the  Glaxo-Wellcome merger  achieves these 
goals from my perspective. A nice feature of a clinical paper is that differ- 
ent readers can reach very different conclusions. I am afraid that my con- 
clusions may be quite different from those of the authors. 
The papers in this volume fall into two categories: bad acquisitions and 
good acquisitions. The goal of the bad acquisition papers is to understand 
why  managers make bad acquisitions, while the goal of the good acquisi- 
tion papers is to understand  the sources of value in mergers. This is so 
despite the fact that it may be difficult to categorize a merger without the 
benefit of 20/20 hindsight, and sometimes even with it. In any event, this 
paper falls into the good acquisitions category and focuses on value cre- 
ation in the merger of Glaxo and Wellcome. Certainly, the stock market 
thought the merger was good news. 
There are four broad reasons why  a horizontal  merger may enhance 
stock market value: (1) cost savings; (2) revenue enhancement unrelated 
to market power; (3) acquisition of market power; and (4) the market’s ex- 
pecting the companies to do something worse. This paper focuses on cost 
savings and, to some extent, revenue enhancement, but I wish to explore 
the last two explanations as well. 
As Ravenscraft and  Long point  out, the pharmaceutical  companies 
were prime candidates to make acquisitions in the 1990s, with torrents of 
free cash flow and reduced investment opportunities in their core business. 
A number of companies did make bad or at least questionable acquisi- 
tions, such as the vertical mergers into PBMs by Merck and Eli Lilly. 
In such an environment, a horizontal merger that has little or no nega- 
tive profit implications could raise stock market values. Incorrect expecta- 
tions of very bad decisions can be a source of  shareholder gains, but it 
would be a mistake to conclude that such a merger creates value. 
The authors do not give much weight to the possibility that the merger 
increases market power. They base this conclusion on relatively low con- 
centration in the pharmaceutical industry that is not greatly increased by 
the Glaxo-Wellcome merger. I do not think we  can write off the market 
power story so easily. The new “rational” approach to research and devel- 
opment in the pharmaceutical industry is characterized by companies’ fo- 
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cusing on particular diseases. A merger could lead to a significant reduc- 
tion in R&D competition within a particular class. I have no knowledge 
whether this is  the case in the Glaxo-Wellcome merger nor do I know 
anything about entry barriers into R&D niches, but the potential concerns 
seem real. Further exploration, perhaps just to eliminate any concern, is 
merited. 
Revenue enhancement is another possible source of value. The idea is 
that  the merger may  lead  to an increase in  competitive rents  through 
mechanisms like brand-name extension. The authors do not seem to be- 
lieve  that  revenue  enhancement  was  an important  motivation  for  the 
merger and I agree. 
Cost savings from a merger can be divided into three types. First, there 
can be  cost savings from exploiting economies of scale and scope. This 
is pushing out the production possibility frontier. Second, a merger may 
improve efficiency,  thereby moving from the interior  of  the production 
possibility set toward the frontier. Third, a merger can lead to cost savings 
through capacity reduction, or more broadly, a reduction in scale. This 
last cost saving may  not be  an efficiency improvement at all. Costs go 
down but revenues may decline by  as much or more. It may be difficult to 
know whether a reduction in capacity is an efficiency-enhancing elimina- 
tion of excess capacity or simply a reduction in scale. 
One advantage of  a clinical paper is  that it improves our chances of 
distinguishing among these possibilities; Ravenscraft and Long try to do 
just that. Unfortunately, the pharmaceutical industry is  sufficiently com- 
plex that this is quite difficult even with detailed knowledge of the merger 
plans. Much of the anticipated cost savings derived from consolidation of 
production, reductions in R&D, and reductions in sales forces. It is very 
difficult to know if this is a reduction in scale, elimination of excess capac- 
ity, or scale economies. This is especially difficult for R&D reductions and 
sales force consolidation. A smaller sales force may result in reduced sales 
in the not-so-immediate future and reductions in R&D may  show up in 
output reductions in only the very distant future. Accounting data will not 
help. The authors suggest that senior management itself would not know 
how to categorize sales force reduction among the three categories. The 
authors believe that reduction is a small part of the cost savings, but I do 
not see sufficient evidence to reach this conclusion. 
I find the most interesting issue in the paper is the discussion of whether 
the cost savings could be achieved without the merger. The authors argue 
that enhanced efficiency of R&D could in theory. I would add that much 
of the reductions in production capacity and sales force probably could as 
well,  given the large size of the two companies. The authors’ interviews 
suggest that the merger provided an opportunity to “take a fresh look at 
the organization” in a way that we  are to infer would be impossible with- 
out the merger. I wish the authors had pushed the managers to explain 326  David J. Ravenscraft and William F. Long 
why. I understand why it is necessary to “take a fresh look at the organiza- 
tion” with the merger, but do not understand why it is impossible to do so 
without a merger. A $3.8 billion premium is a very high price to pay for a 
commitment by  management to increase value through capacity reduc- 
tions. A new cost-cutting CEO should be able to do this for a lot less. A 
cost-cutting CEO may be expensive, but not this expensive. 
I can think of two sets of reasons why a merger may facilitate efficient 
capacity reductions. One is that the disruptions and costs associated with 
the reductions are lower as part of a merger implementation. Everyone 
can see the logic and necessity of consolidation with the merger. It may be 
easier to keep good employees and maintain morale and productivity. The 
second set of explanations are managerial agency problems. Maybe man- 
agers do not like their companies to shrink and it may be very unpleasant 
for management to reduce capacity because of a lack of growth opportu- 
nities. Perhaps the target’s employees bear most of the burden and there- 
fore it is less unpleasant for the acquirer’s management. Of course, this is 
all idle speculation, which is exactly what a good clinical paper like this 
one should generate. 